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THE JUSTICE MISSION AND MENTAL HEALTH LAW
STEVEN R. SMITH1

Mental health law's concern with justice, so much a part of the discussion of
civil commitment, the insanity defense and other traditional mental health
subjects, has been a neglected subject in one important area. Malpractice claims
against mental health professionals commonly are slow, expensive and
embarrassing for the professional and the injured. Processing these claims
creates great stress on plaintiffs and defendants alike. The distress caused to
defendants has, to some degree, been discussed.2 The more profound effects
that the system of public lawsuits can have on plaintiffs have not received
sufficient attention. To pursue a malpractice claim, plaintiffs in such cases are
required to reveal extraordinarily private matters in a public forum. This
process is inconsistent with the most basic values and concepts of the mental
health disciplines. Whether viewed from the insights of therapeutic
jurisprudence, as Professor Wexler has suggested, 3 or in terms of simple justice,
the current malpractice process is unnecessarily harmful to injured plaintiffs.
A just and compassionate system for reviewing mental health malpractice
claims should strive to: (1) protect patient privacy; (2) conclude claims quickly
and efficiently; (3) promote consistent and predictable resolution of claims; (4)
assure that decisions conform to announced legal principles and the best
available science; and (5) encourage mental health practitioners to engage in
high quality and ethical practice. The current system of public trials clearly does
4
not succeed in meeting these goals in many cases.
The spectacle of patient secrets being revealed publicly as the result of a
malpractice case is inconsistent with the goals of the mental health professions.
Confidentiality and the obligation to maintain patient secrets have been

1

Dean and Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
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See, e.g., SARA C. CHARLES & EUGENE KENNEDY, DEFENDANT: A
PSYCHIATRIST ON TRIAL FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 210-24 (1985) (exploring
the chillingeffecton the practices of those physicians threatened by malpractice
claims); E. Donald Shapiro, Book Review, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 867,867 (1986)
(refusing to find the legal profession at fault for the medical malpractice crisis).
3
See DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (1992); David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,[this symposium].
4
These principles, of course, are important in processing all malpractice
cases. They are critical in mental health malpractice where extremely private
information is involved.
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hallmarks of the mental health professions. These professions have stressed
5
that confidentiality is essential to successful therapy and to patient well-being.
Psychotherapy requires that patients reveal the most sensitive information
about themselves and their families. Patients often disclose information they
would not share with anyone else. Therapy deals not only with factual
information that can be embarrassing, but also with the most intimate fantasies,
fears, and anxieties. In short, mental health malpractice cases will reveal
information surrounding the most private details of the patient's life. So
sensitive and personal is this information, that there has been broad agreement
that a psychotherapist-patient privilege is justified even though a general
6
medical or health care privilege is not.
The public nature of malpractice cases means that extremely personal patient
information will not merely be revealed in camera, but will be available to
others. Not only will the information elicited at trial be disclosed, but
considerably more information will be revealed during the discovery process.
The breadth of discovery in civil cases leaves little information about the mental
health of the patient beyond potential inspection.7 Additionally, discovery is
not limited to information held by the mental health professional against whom
5 See, e.g., GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHATRY, CONFIDENTIALITY
AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 92 (1960)
("There is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful
psychiatric treatment .... A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment'). All
mental health professions include in their code of ethics a confidentiality
provision. Several studies have considered the importance of confidentiality
from a utilitarian perspective with somewhat mixed results. See, e.g., Daniel W.
Shuman & Myron F. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of
60 N.C. L. REV. 893,926 (1982) (concluding that
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege,
confidentiality is required for building trust); Steven R. Smith, Medical and
Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving With One Hand and
Removing With the Other, 75 Ky. L. J. 473,547-49 (1987) [hereinafter Medicaland
PsychotherapyPrivileges and Confidentiality] (asserting that current statutes do
not adequately support confidentiality in psychotherapy).
6
See, e.g., Proposed Rules of Evidence, Rule 504, reprintedin 56 F.R.D. 183,
240-41 (1972) (providing for a psychotherapist-patient privilege); JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2285, 2380a (J.McNaughton ed., 1961 &
Supp. 1988) (discussing general principles and policies behind privileges);
Medical and PsychotherapyPrivilegesand Confidentiality,supra note 5, at 546-49
(asserting the importance of protecting confidentiality through a privilege).
7See Ralph Slovenko, Psychotherapist-PatientTestimonial Privilege: A Picture
of Misguided Hope,23 CATH. U. L. REV. 649 (1974). The very nature of discovery
is to allow fishing expeditions to determine what information may be relevant
at trial. The discovery process, therefore, results in the examination of much
more information than will be actually used at trial. It is often very difficult to
ensure that information requested in discovery is relevant until after it has been
released to the opposing party. Thus, the discovery exceptions to the privilege
have left little or no protection for the psychotherapist-patient relationship. Id.
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the malpractice case is filed. The plaintiff's mental condition before seeing the
professional may be relevant to determine whether malpractice caused the
injury. As a result, much of the information from prior psychotherapy may be
relevant and is, therefore, discoverable. Furthermore, the mental health and
treatment of the patient subsequent to any malpractice is usually relevant to
the question of damages, so information from that subsequent treatment will
probably be discoverable. Thus, virtually the entire mental health history of the
plaintiff may be revealed during the mental health malpractice case.8
The difficulty facing plaintiffs is illustrated by an injured patient harmed by
a therapist's actionable breach of confidentiality. To pursue such legal claims,
plaintiffs must undertake lawsuits which will inevitably require that they
publicly reveal considerably more about their emotional conditions than their
negligent therapists ever revealed. Ironically, the patients' lawsuits may
exacerbate the very harm for which they seek compensation.
Psychotherapist-patient privileges will not protect the patient's sensitive
information during a malpractice case. The patient-litigant exception destroys
the privilege because the plaintiff brings his or her own mental conditions into
question by filing the suit.9 Thus, a potential malpractice plaintiff faces the
unhappy choice of giving up a potentially legitimate claim for damages or
agreeing to reveal large amounts of very sensitive personal information.
Plaintiffs who bring mental health malpractice claims often must relive
publicly their most troubling experiences. Like the rape victim who is forced
to confront the attacker, describe publicly the experience, and (in days past)
disclose prior sexual history, injured mental health malpractice plaintiffs must
agree to have the most private aspect of their lives examined, explained,
attacked, and viewed in public. Furthermore, the plaintiffs who undertake this
emotionally difficult process are people whose emotional difficulty and
fragility probably caused them to seek psychotherapy in the first place.
Attorneys representing mental health plaintiffs often appear insensitive to
the harm and pain that vigorously pursuing a mental health claim may cause
the plaintiff. The plaintiff may be harmed by the emotional stress of prolonged
proceedings, the release of private information, and the need to confront a
formerly intimately trusted mental health professional. The standard personal
injury approach may promote the legal interests of the plaintiff in a technical
sense while seriously harming the person's general welfare. In many cases, the
overall interests of clients may be better served with a less legalistic due process

8

id.; See Steven R. Smith, ConstitutionalPrivacy in Psychotherapy,49 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1980) [hereinafter ConstitutionalPrivacy].
9
A patient waives the patient-litigant privilege when she brings her own
mental condition into question. See ConstitutionalPrivacy,supranote 8, at 52-53.
Courts have universally accepted the exception to avoid the unfairness of
allowing a person who raises mental condition questions to hide behind the
privilege in order to prevent opposing parties from obtaining the information
necessary to challenge the claims. Id.
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approach in exchange for a faster and less public resolution of mental health
disputes. Mental health malpractice litigation does not produce a sense of
justice and compassion, nor is it consistent with the goals and values of the
mental health or legal professions.
Because of the problems of the civil trial system in mental health malpractice
cases, optional forums such as investigative panels and binding arbitration
should be available to the injured mental health patient. The mental health
professions might establish professional compensation funds to which those
injured by the serious misconduct of a member of the profession could apply
for assistance. An interdisciplinary panel composed of mental health
professionals, attorneys, and others would investigate cases and then
determine what compensation or restitution was appropriate. Such an
approach is distinguished from other proposals that would make such panels
mandatory.10 This proposal is to use panels solely at the option of the plaintiff
for the same reasons that the confidentiality of therapy exists at the option of
the patient-it is the patient's personal information that requires protection.
Mental health patients should also have binding arbitration available as an
additional nonjudicial option with which to pursue mental health malpractice
claims. Thus, as a matter of legal right, injured patients would have the option
of either binding arbitration or the special investigative panel described above,
as an alternative to a civil lawsuit against mental health professionals. At the
same time, no mental health professional or institution should be permitted to
require that a patient agree, prior to an injury, to use the panel to resolve any
claims or to enter into a binding contract limiting the patient's choice of forum.
The conventional wisdom suggests that panels and arbitrators are less
sympathetic to plaintiffs, or at least give lower awards, than juries. Although
plaintiffs as a group have not done that well in jury trials in mental health
cases,11 it is probably true that in some cases (particularly where there has been
outrageous conduct or grievous injury) juries may give higher awards. In those
cases, plaintiffs could choose the usual civil jury trial. More importantly,
however, plaintiffs could rationally choose a nonjury option even assuming it
meant the possibility of a lower award. The benefits of maintaining the privacy
of their mental health information and the ability to quickly conclude the claim
in a less threatening environment may well outweigh the chance of a higher
economic award. Furthermore, from the plaintiff's perspective, the efficiencies
of the options may reduce the total costs of pursuing a claim and offset some
the possible economic disadvantages of the informal mechanisms.

10
See, e.g., Kirk R. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternativefor
Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1365, 1379 (1989)
(proposing mandatory panel for deciding malpractice claims).

11 See, e.g., JEFFREY D. ROBERTSON, PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE: LIABILITY OF
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 5 (1988) (maintaining that the majority of

mental health malpractice claims result in favorable verdicts for the defendant).
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This conventional wisdom often causes plaintiffs' attorneys to object to
nonjury determinations of liability and damages. They might, therefore, be
expected to advise many plaintiffs not to opt for the arbitration or investigative
panel. In mental health cases, however, this may be bad advice in light of the
total interests of the plaintiff, as opposed to the plaintiff's interest in wringing
every last dollar out of a case. As a sophisticated mental health bar develops,
perhaps it will become more sensitive to the harm that mental health
malpractice plaintiffs can suffer from the process of preparing for and going
through a public trial.
The legal system has been insensitive to the harm it inflicts on mental health
patients who pursue malpractice claims. Too often even patients' lawyers have
also ignored the potential for harm. Because the current system conflicts with
the most fundamental values of the mental health professions themselves,
those professions should take the lead in reforming the processing of mental
health claims, or at least offer alternative forms which are more nearly
consistent with the values and principles of mental health care.
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